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Analyzing the Impact of Structural Change 




Replacement of the traditional interest based credit system with an Islamic credit system 
was one of the fundamental changes in Iran since 1979. The Islamic credit system, offers 
the prospect of risk sharing between the borrower and the lender. Small farmers are likely 
to be risk averse and they are reluctant to go heavily into debt in order to finance invest-
ments in new technology and capital intensive methods of production which they perceive 
to be risky. Farmer's decision making behaviour with regard to risk under the Islamic and 
interest based credit systems are explored with the aid of a simple conceptual model. 
Analysis of attitudinal data suggests that the majority of small farmers prefer credit pro-
vided under the Islamic credit system. Farmers' preferences for taking out loans from an 
Islamic credit system were found to be related to a number of factors. Risk sharing and 
religious acceptability of the profit and loss sharing loans over the interest based loans 
were two significant reasons.
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Introduction
The adoption of the Islamic credit system and the s ocio-economic impact of this inno-
vation on the agricultural sector is a development  of considerable potential interest to 
economists in Iran.  
Following the 1979 Iranian revolution, two fundamen tal changes were made towards 
introducing an Islamic financial system consistent  with the beliefs of the new government 
( Central Bank of Iran, 1985/6). The first step was to nationalise all the private  banks, and 
the second step was to replace the traditional inte rest-based credit system with an Islamic 
credit system. The introduction of the Islamic cred it system has considerable potential sig-
nificance. One of the fundamental principles of Isl am is the prohibition of interest on bor-
rowed money ( Reba). This principle is the main feature that differen tiates interest-based 
credit from Islamic credit systems. Pre-determined  interest is treated as an offence against 
morals and has also been condemned by other religio us and non-religious groups over his-
tory including the Catholic Church, the Jews in the  Old Testament, and by Greek and Ro-
man philosophers ( Taylor & Evans 1987, Anwar 1987). The general argument for prohibit-
ing fixed interest payments has been given in Siddi qi 1983. However the detail description 
of the Islamic credit system is not the purpose of  this paper. There are several literatures 
explaining the system in details (  Siddiqi 1983, Khan, W. 1985, Sadr 1980, Anwar1987, 
Haque 1983). This paper mainly emphasised on evaluation of ag ricultural loans granted by 
the Islamic credit system. 
*  The  author  is  an  Associate  Professor,  The  Department  of  Agricultural  Economics,  University  of  
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Agricultural producers are subject to severe produc tion and market risks, which are re-
flected in wide fluctuations in output and incomes.  The consequences of adverse outcomes 
is generally increased where farmers make use of cr edit under traditional/conventional 
western style borrowing arrangements as the borrowe r is solely responsible for any losses 
which occur. This aspect of credit is encapsulated  in the concept of increased risk associ-
ated with increasing capital gearing ( Barnard and Nix 1979). The combined effect of capi-
tal gearing in magnifying production and market ris ks is likely to act as a powerful deter-
rent to the adoption of new technology where this c an only be financed through borrowing.  
Anwar, M. (1987) summarised the findings of many de velopment economists who con-
cluded that risk is a crucial factor influencing sm all farmer’s investment decisions. In par-
ticular it was argued that poor small farmers who o perate close to the subsistence level are 
likely to be risk averse and extremely reluctant to  go heavily into debt in order to finance 
investment in capital intensive inputs or adopt new  technology, despite the very high ex-
pected returns that these investments promise. 
It is argued that if the riskiness of these investm ents could be reduced it is probable that 
one of the major barriers to their adoption will be  reduced and credit uptake levels will be 
increased. In another words, if risk averse individ uals can reduce or shift the whole or a 
part of the risk to a third party they may be less  reluctant to engage in risky investments. 
Efficient devices for risk management would allow a  farmer to take substantial levels of 
risk without being in danger of losing all his prod uctive assets in the event of enterprise 
failure  (Binswanger 1978). Risk to the producers can be reduced either throu gh technical 
means within the production system (e.g. diversific ation in cropping) or alternatively by 
sharing the risk with a third party (e.g. through i nsurance, future markets, price stabilisa-
tion, Islamic credit system, etc). The Islamic cred it system which is an alternative mecha-
nism for reducing risk offers the prospect of lifti ng part of the risk off the farmers' shoul-
ders through the provision of profit and loss shari ng loans. In this way such loans not only 
totally avoid the magnification of risk associated  with debt financed investment under a 
western style interest based credit system, but the y also carry a share of the production 
risk. Therefore it is reasonable to conclude that t he introduction of the Islamic credit sys-
tem should result in wider credit use to finance pr oductive investment in agriculture. The 
purpose of this paper is to use the empirical evide nce to evaluate the Islamic credit system 
as it currently operates in Iran. The first part of  this paper provides an explanation of dif-
ferent type of loans under the Islamic credit syste m. The second part explores the risk shar-
ing potential of the Islamic credit system. Farmer' s decision making behaviour with regard 
to risk under the Islamic and interest based credit  systems is explored with the aid of a 
simple conceptual model suggested by the author. Th e model examines the interaction be-
tween debt financed investment in new technology an d the magnification/reduction in in-
come variability resulting from interest based and  Islamic credit systems. The model pro-
vides a theoretical basis to support the propositio n that profit and loss sharing loans avail-
able under the Islamic credit system should operate  in a way which would enable risk 
averse farmers to contemplate investments in new te chnology which they would be reluc-
tant to adopt using interest based credit. 
The investigation reports in next section on progre ss made in adopting the Islamic credit 
system and examine farmers' attitudes towards the n ew system and the extent to which 
they have altered their borrowing behaviour since i t was introduced. In particular the hy-
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risk averse farmers and is likely to result in grea ter productive (capital) investment" will be 
tested.
Finally, the distribution of credit under the new c redit system through the Agricultural 
Bank (the main specialised source of agricultural c redit in Iran), is examined. Considera-
tion will also be given to the practical problems a ssociated with the operation of the Is-
lamic credit system.  
Method and Material
Data for analysis were collected from three sources ; i)A farm level survey of 200 farm-
ers drawn from two states in Iran ii)a survey of 30  Agricultural Bank branches in those two 
states and iii)national level data from the Agricul tural Bank itself in year 2002/3. 
The method which was used to examine the structural  change in credit system was a de-
scriptive analyzes. Farmers’ attitudes towards curr ent credit system and trend on loans 
consumption were examined.  
Under the Islamic credit system there are two ways  of granting credit facilities; inter-
est-free loans, and profit and loss sharing loans  (Sidiqi 1985, Khan, S. 1987, Ahmed 1977).
The interest free loan scheme is available to finan ce small scale enterprises. There are 
no interest charges, but the financial institutions  are allowed to charge a very small percent 
as an administration cost for each loan. These loan s are granted to borrowers whose in-
comes are below the poverty line and who have socia l commitments such as school fees, 
medical expenses, or who have suffered a set-back d ue to unexpected events (i.e. sickness, 
crop failure, flood, drought, etc) and in cases whe re a high social priority is attached to a 
particular type of enterprise  (Central Bank of Iran).
The second method of granting fund is Profit and Lo ss Sharing Loans (PLS). Financial 
institutions are permitted by Islamic laws to grant  credit based on profit and loss sharing 
loans granted for productive purposes  (Khan, M. 1986, Khan, S. 1987). Under PLS interest 
is replaced by a proportion of the profit gained fr om the investment funded by the loan. 
The income of credit institutions is derived direct ly from the actual profits realised from 
the projects financed and risk is redistributed to  financial market participants who are more 
willing to bear it. The lender's share depends dire ctly on the level of profit made by the 
project, so that the consequences of a change in ou tcome are shared between the lender and 
borrower  (Scharf 1982 , El Gousi 1982).
The essential features of the profit and loss shari ng loans are; 
1-  all capital is risk capital, return of the princ ipal is not guaranteed.  
2-  Capital is not entitled to any fixed or predeter mined rate of return therefore may not get 
a return even if the principal is repaid. Both part ies contribute by providing capital for a 
specified project (permitted under Islamic law) and  period of time with the intention of 
making a profit which they share between them  (Siddiqi 1983, Khan, W. 1985, Sadr 
1980, Anwar 1987).  
In a profit and loss sharing loan under the Islamic  credit system interest is replaced by a 
proportion of profit gained from the investment mad e by the borrowed capital. The Islamic 
financial institutions are permitted by Islamic law s to grant credit based on profit and loss 
sharing for productive purposes  (Khan, M. 1986). The income of credit institutions is de-
rived directly from the actual profits realised fro m the projects financed. Since the credit 8 AGRICULTURAL ECONOMICS REVIEW 
system is sharing the actual outcome of the investm ent with users of funds, the system is 
called the Profit and Loss sharing credit system  (PLS). The Profit and Loss sharing credit 
system redistributes the risk between financial mar ket and participants who are more will-
ing to bear it. The lender's share under PLS arrang ement depends directly on the level of 
profit made by the project, so that the consequence s of a change in outcome are shared 
between the lender and borrower  (Scharf 1982, El Gousi 1982).Under PLS the shares of 
the lender and borrower are determined as set out i n equation (1) and (2) respectively: 
L = R. a  (1)
B = R (1 – a)  (2)
Where,  L is lender's receipt  
B is the borrower's receipt, 
R is the total profit or loss from the project, 
a is the proportion of the lender’s share of the tot al profit, 
(1-a)  is the borrower's share from the total profit or  loss. 
  Both,  L and  B vary and are a function of  R and  a.
The important characteristics of a profit and loss  sharing loan is that it both shares the 
borrower's business risks (due to uncertainty in yi eld and prices) and avoids the financial 
risk associated with servicing debt. This is in con trast to conventional western-style inter-
est-bearing credit where the borrower carries all t he business risk and where that exposure 
is amplified by borrowing and the commitment to pay  interest. In consequence, small risk-
averse farmers may be more prepared to make use of  profit-and-loss-sharing loans to fi-
nance the increased resources needed for the adopti on of new technology. 
Results and Discussion 
Attitudes towards the Agricultural Credit System
As it was noticed, a major change in the credit sys tem following the 1979 revolution 
was the abandonment of interest based credit in fav our of interest-free and profit and loss 
sharing loans. In this part of the study farmers at titudes about two type of credit systems 
were analysed. The results from the survey suggest  that the majority of farmers (77 per-
cent) with small holdings prefer profit and loss sh aring loans over the interest-based loans 
as table 1 shows. In contrast, the majority of larg e farmers (68 percent) prefer interest 
based loans. 
The contrasting attitudes of large and small farmer s are potentially of great significance 
because it suggests that the attributes of differen t credit systems may influence the level of 
borrowing by different size groups of farmers to di fferent extend. This clearly warranted 
further investigation. The size difference is likel y to reflect levels of income. When atti-
tudes towards the credit system wer e analyzed in terms of level of income it was found  that 
as the financial position of farmers improves profi t and loss sharing loans starts to lose 
their attraction. This result may reflect an increa sing ability to bear risk as income in-
creases, and as a consequence the reduction in risk  aversion could encourage farmers to 
shift their preference from the profit and loss sha ring loans to interest based loans. Table 2 
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Table 1.  Farmers' Attitudes Towards Types of Loans 
Farm Size (jirib   )
0-20  20-60  Above 60  Over all  Preferred Loan 
Number  %  Number %  Number %  Number  % 
Profit and Loss sharing Loans  77  69  39  57  6  32  122  61 
Interest based loans  35  31  30  43  13  68  78  39 
Total  112  100 69  100 19  100 200 100
Source: Study Survey. Chi-square (  
2 ) = 7.644** significant at 5 percent level. # = 0.1  hectare. 
Table 2.  Farmers' Attitudes towards Type of Loans by Income  Level 
Income Level 
Low  Medium  High  Total  Preferred System 
Number %  Number %  Number %  Number  % 
Profit and Loss sharing loans  69  70  45  58  8  30  122  61 
Interest Based loans  26  31  33  42  19  70  78  39 
Total  95  100 78  100 27  100 200 100
Source: Study Survey.  Chi-square = 8.66** signific ant at 5 percent level .
Reasons for Preferring Profit and Loss Sharing Loan s 
Farmers were asked to identify their reasons for pr eferring the profit and loss sharing 
credit system over interest based systems. Risk sha ring and religious factors are the main 
reasons given by farmers preferring the profit and  loss sharing loans  (table 3).
Table 3.  Reasons given for Preferring Profit and Loss Sharin g Loans (by Income Level) 
Income Level 
Low  Medium  High  Total  Reasons
Number  %  Number  %  Number  %  Number  % 
Risk sharing  33  48  18  40  2  25  53  43 
Better advice  10  14  8  18  1  13  19  16 
Follows Islamic Law  24  35  14  31  3  38  41  34 
Easy to get  2  3  4  9  1  12  7  6 
Others   -  -  1  2  1  12  2  1 
Total  69  100 45  100 8  100 122 100
Source: Study Survey
It is possibly significant that as income increases  risk sharing becomes a relatively less 
important reason for preferring profit and loss sha ring loans over interest based credit 
loans. The religious reason, mentioned by 34 percen t of all farmers who prefer profit and 
loss sharing loans, was of equal importance among a ll size groups. In other words religious 
reasons appear to be independent of income level. 
Although small farmers appear both to prefer and ar e willing to borrow from the Is-
lamic credit system this does not necessarily mean  that they will be successful in obtaining 
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ductive investment was undertaken under the Islamic  system and whether small farmers in 
practice were also able to obtain more credit from  the Islamic credit system. Data on the 
lending activities of the Agricultural Bank from bo th official statistics at the national level 
and from the survey of Agricultural Bank branches i n the study areas were analyzed. The 
results are presented in the next two sections. 
Changes in Use of Loans
Under the Islamic credit system it is intended that  funds are for productive purposes 
rather than for consumption. Changes in the pattern  of agricultural credit are also to be ex-
pected from a government that has strongly stated i ts backing for the rural poor and at-
tacked previous governments for their neglect of th e rural sector. Hence one would expect 
that with the introduction of the new credit system , the direction of funds would move to-
wards financing productive (capital) investment.  
Table 4.  Distribution of Credit by the Agricultural Bank in  1975/6 to 2002/3  (Million Rials)






1975|/6  35,290  19,363 (55%)  15,927 (45%) 
1976/7 42,355  23,004 (54%)  19,351 (46%) 
1977/8 51,757  27,187 (53%)  24,570 (47%) 
1978/9 42,150  19,566 (46%)  22,584 (54%) 
1979/80 96,479  44,014 (46%)  52,465 (54%) 
1980/1 123,530  61,272 (50%)  62,258 (50%) 
1981/2 148,378  73,954 (50%)  74,424 (50%) 
1982/3 183,855  88,053 (49%)  95,802 (51%) 
1983/4 220,771  104,924 (48%)  115,847 (52%) 
1984/5  155,767  45,157 (29%)  110,610 (71%) 
1985/6  200,073  42,602 (21%)  157,471 (79%) 
1986/7  201,942  44,217 (22%)  157,725 (78%) 
1987/88  279,913  67,202 (24%)  212,711 (76%) 
1988/9  382,629  164,530(43%)  218,098 (57%) 
1989/90 444,288  137,284 (31%)  267,017 (60%) 
1990/1 626,401  238,658 (38%)  387,742 (62%) 
1991/2  956,940  164,500(27%)  792,440 (74%) 
1992/3  1,076,457  417,665(32%)  658,791 (68%) 
1993/4  1,752,106  473,068(27%)  1,279,038 (73%) 
1994/5  2,363,700  679,700(29%)  1,684,000 (71%) 
1995/6  3,361,902  873,900 (26%)  2,488,002 (74%) 
1996/7  3,695,188  976,329 (26%)  2,718,859 (74%) 
1997/8  5,288,243  1,107,837 (21%)  4,180,406 (79%) 
1998/9  6,791,048  1,142,500 (21%)  5,648,548 (79%) 
1999/2000  8,055,100  1,945,000 (24%)  6,110,000 (76%)  
2000/1  10,663,981  2,191,000 (21%)  8,472,981 (79%) 
2001/2  16,881,146  3,491,000 (21%)  13,390,146 (79%) 
2002/3  22,607,647  5,730,200 (25%)  16,877,447 (75%) 
Source; Agricultural Bank Reports.  
Current expenditure= Mozarebeh & Gharzolhasaneh
1 $ = 9000 Rials2006, Vol 7, No 2  11
Tables 4 and 5 show a significant shift in loans fr om funding current expenses to capital 
investment. As table 4 indicates about 75 percent o f total loans from the Agricultural Bank 
went to fund investment on capital items such as ma chinery, irrigation, agricultural build-
ing and livestock in 2002/3.  
Comparison of data concerning the use of credit in  years 1983/4 (the introduction of 
PLS) and afterwards in table 4 suggests a significa nt shift in credit use from current expen-
diture to productive purposes (capital investment).  For example the proportion of credit 
funded for capital expenditure has increased from 5 2% in 1983/4 to 71% in 1984/5 and 
75% in 2002/3. 
An attempt was also made to compare the finding of  national level data with the farm 
level data. A similar pattern emerged in the case o f data from the farm level survey and the 
institutional survey data reported in table 5 which  indicate there is a bias in the direction of 
funds towards capital intensive investments.  
Due to the availability of farm level data only for  years 1978/9 and 2002/3, the direction 
of credit use was compared between these two years.   
The figures in table 5 indicate that between 46 to  69 percent of credit funded current 
expenditure in 1978/9 (when the interest based cred it system was in operation) whereas by 
2002/3 (under the Islamic credit system) this propo rtion had fallen to under 30 percent. 
These findings appear to support the hypotheses tha t under the Islamic credit system more 
productive (capital) investment will be undertaken.  
Table 5.  Use of Credit Taken Up from the Agricultural Bank i n 1977/8 & 2002/3 
Current Expenses & 
Non-Farm Investment 
Capital Investment 
In Agriculture  Year 
Farm Survey  National Level  Farm Survey  National Lev el 
1978/9  69%  46%  31%  45% 
2002/3  29%  25%  71%  75% 
Sources: Agricultural Bank Reports (1978/9& 2002/3)  and Farm and Bank Surveys (2002/3).
The difference between figures reported by banks an d farmers may reflect the effects of 
fungibility (Von Pischke and Adams 1980).
The above findings also seem to reduce the need for  measures to be taken by the Agri-
cultural Bank to constrain the fungibility property  of finance by allocating loans in kind 
and specifying the ultimate use of loans.
Loans Distribution Pattern
Despite relaxing some of the constraints on the sup ply side, such as collateral, small 
farmers are still unable to satisfy their capital r equirements. Analysis was carried out to 
examine the relationship between the amount of mone y advanced and farm size. 
Analysis of farm survey data relating to formal cre dit institutions lending in the study 
area reveals interesting differences in the uptake  of credit by size of farm. The proportion 
of funds advanced to small farmers (less than 20 ji ribs) who constitute more than 56 per-
cent of the survey sample was only 40 percent of th e total amount of loans. Whereas the 
funds borrowed by large farms was 16 percent of the  total amount of loans, although this 
size group accounted for only 10 percent of farmers  in the sample ( table 6). 
Between 1979/80 and 2002/3 there appears to have been l ittle change in the distribution 
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Table 6.  Loans Taken Up From Institutional Credit Sources in  1977/78 and 2002/3 by 
Size of Farm (, 000 Rials) 
1979/80  2002/3  Farm Size 
Number  %  Number %  Number  %  Number  % 
Up to 20 jribs  46  41.0  3,811  38.7  43  38.4  33,282  40 .5 
20-60  "  43  62.3  4,169  42,4  38  55.1  36,024  43.7 
Above 60  "  13  68.4  1,848  18.8  12  63.1  13,128  15.9 
Total 102    9,828    93    82,434   
Source: Survey (2002/3) 
* Percentage of total farmers in each farm size gro up. 
** Percentage of total amount lent .
credit institutions' lending policy in 1983/4 and t he fact that small farmers prefer profit and 
loss sharing loans to interest based loans. In spit e of small farmers' preferences and appar-
ent willingness to borrow using the profit and loss  sharing system, the proportion that have 
succeeded in obtaining credit is much less than tha t of large farmers who achieve a much 
higher loan uptake rate ( table 7).
The findings reported in table 7 indicate that a la rge proportion of small farmers in the 
survey who preferred to get loans from PLS failed t o do so. Discussions with farmers who 
participated in the survey revealed that small farm ers were not able to meet the bank's 
terms for obtaining a loan. On the other hand large  farmers who preferred to pay interest, 
rather than share profits, had no alternative but t o make use of the Islamic credit system 
loans because of the non-availability of interest b ased loans. 
Reason for Not Taking out Loans by Non-Borrowers
Further investigation was undertaken to try to find  out why farmers who were non- bor-
rowers had not taken up loans. Table 8 records the  responses of 107 farmers who did not 
borrow. Whilst non-availability of credit was the m ost frequently recorded response, just 
under a quarter of non-borrowing farmers said they  were unable to obtain the loans they 
required (i.e. high cost, lack of collateral, infor mation requirement, others). It is relevant 
that almost half of the non-borrowing farmers were  deterred from taking out loans for one 
reason or another.  
Table 7.  Comparison of Farmers Attitudinal Preferences and  Actual Distribution of Loans 
Under the Institutional Islamic Credit System in 20 02/3 by Farm Size  (Farm Survey 
Data)
Attitudinal Preferences  Actual Practices 




%  Nos.of Borrowers  % 
0-20 jirib  112 76  68  43  38 
20-60 jiribs  69 39  57  38  55 
Above 60 jiribs  19 6  32  12  63 
Total  200  122    93   
It is possibly relevant to note that farmers no lon ger felt constrained to borrow on reli-
gious grounds. This had previously been an importan t reason given for not borrowing prior 
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Table 8.  Reason for Not Taking out Loans by Non-Borrowers 
Reasons  Number  Percent 
No need to borrow  30 28.0
Credit not available  35 32.7
High cost  9 8.4
Dislike Borrowing  12 11.2
Lack of collateral  6 5.6
Loan term too short  1 0.9
Information requirement  4 3.6
Others  10  9.3
Religious objectives  - -
Total  107  100
Conclusion 
Review of the literature provides support for the v iew that risk and uncertainty pose par-
ticular problems for small farmers operating at or  just above the subsistence level. The fear 
of the consequences of a crop failure coupled with  a debt repayment commitment may 
deter small farmers from borrowing and hence they r emain locked into traditional produc-
tion methods. Social and cultural factors may also  operate to prevent some farmers from 
borrowing - in particular strict Muslims are reluct ant to participate in interest based credit 
systems either as depositors or borrowers. The poss ibility that the Islamic credit system 
could act as a way of both reducing risk by sharing  profits and losses with the lending in-
stitutions was identified as potentially important  in overcoming problems of increased risk 
associated with conventional interest based credit  systems as well as being more accept-
able on religious grounds.  
The evidence reported in the paper suggests that th e majority of small farmers prefer to 
borrow using a profit and loss sharing credit syste m rather than an interest based system, 
whereas larger farms and farmers with higher income s prefer the interest based credit sys-
tem. However in practice the large farmers appear t o benefit most in terms of the number 
of loans and size of loan as compared to small farm ers who constitute the largest propor-
tion of the rural population in the study areas. Ev en though banks are not profit orientated 
the limited supply of funds means that some form of  credit allocation between applicants is 
required. The results imply that institutions may b e using size of farm as a criterion for 
distributing credit. The findings also suggest that  in practice farmers have to go against 
their preferences. These findings do not support th e hypothesis that under the Islamic 
credit system funds will shift towards small farmer s. Although small farmers are more 
willing to borrow under the Islamic credit system,  large farmers still receive a dispropor-
tionate share of the funds available. A number of f actors may account for this phenome-
non:
1-  Bankers wish to be promoted by demonstrating suc cess in their operations to the au-
thorities. Hence they may select better off investo rs who are more likely to be success-
ful and generate greater profits than small farmers .  
2-  Lack of profitable investment opportunities for  small farmers which will enable them 
to meet the bank's conditions and get acceptance fo r funds. As the Agricultural Bank 
usually only provides credit for production purpose s, small farmers with fewer in-
vestment opportunities often need to borrow for con sumption purposes which can not 
be funded. 14 AGRICULTURAL ECONOMICS REVIEW 
3-  the excess demand of funds causes the lender to  try to create a number of restrictions 
(e.g. Require unnecessary documentation) which rais es the transaction costs for poten-
tial borrowers. As a consequence, credit tends to e nd up in the hands of large farmers 
who are more likely to be able to afford to meet th ese higher costs.  
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